29 July 2011

Design and falsifiability

Last month I had an interesting conversation with Casey Luskin of the Discovery Institute (DI), at Evolution News and Views (ENV), a DI blog/site that recently opened some articles to comments. The topic of the original post was common ancestry in humans and other primates, but Casey and I discussed various aspects of design thought.

One subject that came up was the falsifiability of design. I maintain that design arguments, whenever they also postulate the existence of an omnipotent deity (or any super-powerful being, for that matter), are inherently unfalsifiable. And I want some feedback on my argument.

Here's what I wrote on ENV:
Design is unfalsifiable to whatever extent the postulated designer is capable of acting in the world. If the designer (like the Creator God) is omnipotent, then it is impossible to rule out deliberate design in any place at any time. This is a necessary conclusion that can only be avoided by restricting the expected actions/motives of the designer. You claim that "shared non-functional similarities" can falsify "common design," and that's true only if you have defined "common design" in a fairly restricted way. What such similarities don't do – cannot do – is rule out the action of a designer. (That designer could have other reasons for doing things the way she does, meaning that "shared non-functional similarities" could evince design just as strongly as any other genomic feature.) That's what I mean when I say that design is unfalsifiable, and I hope that clarifies things.
Casey's response focuses on "the theory of intelligent design," which he claims is solely concerned with positive evidence for intelligent design, which is assumed to be detectable in the world. He concedes that yes, the theory could fail to detect design when/if the designer has acted in ways indistinguishable from "secondary material causes." He illustrates this using a standard type of example of design (in his case, flowers that spell out "Welcome to Disneyland").

He's right about all that. But I think he's wrong about the falsifiability of design, and he himself has told us why. Consider his flower-based message example. He's quite right that a person (let's call him Steve) looking at a bed of flowers that spells out a message in English can and should conclude that the flower bed is the product of design. But Steve can't point at any other collection of flowers and claim that it is not the product of design.

In order to make that claim, Steve would first need to stipulate some of the characteristics of the designer (we'll call her Coco). Specifically, Steve would need to tell us whether Coco is thought to – or known to – design flower beds that don't look designed (to Steve). And this is where my argument gets specific: I maintain that once Steve postulates Coco's omnipotence, then he has acknowledged Coco's ability to design flower beds of every possible configuration, few of which Steve would identify as "designed." Thus any designation of a flower bed as "designed" is unfalsifiable, since all flower beds are potentially designed regardless of their appearance. If Steve wants his design argument to be falsifiable, he needs to further specify Coco's characteristics (limitations, preferences, and so on) as a designer and explain how such characteristics can enable him to rule out design of a particular flower bed.

If Steve takes Casey's line and claims not to know anything about Coco, then Steve cannot under any conditions point to anything that Coco didn't design. And so his claim that the flower-based message is designed is unfalsifiable.

We can add that this doesn't mean Steve is wrong. In fact, in the case of the hideous "Welcome to Disneyland" flower bed, we'd all agree that he's right. It just means that his design claim can't be falsified.

Now, I don't think this means that design thought is therefore nonsense, or that attempts to identify evidence of design are therefore invalid. Not at all. But I do think it points to a vast difference between "the scientific theory of intelligent design" and common descent. Common descent is falsifiable, at least on a case-by-case basis, meaning that there are observations we can imagine that could not be explained in principle by common ancestry. But it seems to me that there is no such observation vis-a-vis intelligent design, especially when/if the designer is taken to be super-powerful or even omnipotent.

[Cross-posted at Panda's Thumb]

40 comments:

chunkdz said...

Scientist Jerry Coyne once told me that he would believe in God when a 900 ft. Jesus appeared in the sky...

He studied with Lewontin.

Don't that just make you want to eat his liver, Steve? Just a little bit?

SteveMatheson said...

Dang, I was kinda hoping the first comment would be about falsifiability, maybe grumping about Popper or mentioning nuances in the word 'design.'

chunkdz said...

Evidently, not all scientists share your need for falsifiability. If scientist Jerry Coyne can detect not only design but God Almighty himself - with no need for your Popperian predilections - who are you to question him?

He studied with Lewontin.

SteveMatheson said...

Thanks for the comments on the post. Did you read it?

Bradm said...

A couple things... First, why does it matter whether something is falsifiable or not?  Falsification is not a criterion for something to qualify as "scientific" for a number of reasons (e.g., empirical and non-empirical are not easily separated, logical issues, etc.).  

Second, even if you don't accept that falsificationism is completely dead, the version you are talking about certainly is.  You and Luskin are arguing about what Lakatos called naive falsificationism.  This version of falsificationism acts on individual theories and puts a lot of value on "refuting" experiments.  Lakatos pointed out that it is not theories and empirical evidence that are in conflict but theories and other theories.   What Lakatos claims is that how theories become "falsified" is by more progressive theories taking the place of degenerating theories.  The naive falsificationist says that it is an experiment that falsifies a theory, whether or not there is a rival theory to take its place.  

In your last paragraph you do actually compare one theory to another but your reasoning is wrong.  The "vast difference" between the two theories is not because one has "case-by-case" instances of falsification and the other doesn't but because one theory is progressing and the other is degenerating.  

As to your specific argument, I think it is kind of pointless to argue about.  You mention yourself that falsifiability says nothing about the truth of a theory and as I mentioned above it also says nothing about the scientific status of a theory.  Assuming your argument is correct - that we can't falsify a theory that postulates an omnipotent designer - then my question for you is ... so what?

SteveMatheson said...

Hello, and thanks for the comment. I don't take falsification by itself to indicate "science," and I completely agree with the point made by Lakatos.

To answer your main question: I think that noting the unfalsifiability of a design claim (esp. when the designer is assumed to be super-powerful) is a way to emphasize something that I think is huge: that talking about "design" without talking about the designer can lead to incoherence. It seems to me that when one points to something in biology and says, "it's designed," the claim is vacuous at best if one can't point at anything else and say, "and that's not designed." A key implication, it seems to me, is that everything is potentially designed in a world ruled by an omnipotent deity, and you don't have to be a Reformed scholar to know where to look for claims just like that. Unfalsifiability matters to me in this context because of how it arises: from permanent uncertainty in the presence of omnipotence.

And I do believe that this is one vast difference between the "theories" in question. Not "the vast difference"...those are your words.

chunkdz said...

Yeah. It's piss poor and here's why.

You've presented Casey's argument under the guise of a false dichotomy. As you present it, Casey can only claim that the designer is either omnipotent or completely unknown. 

In truth, Casey needs (and does) make only one claim about the designer: that his designs are detectable. 

I have no doubt that you were able to spot the flaw in Jerry Coyne's reasoning rather quickly. Ask yourself why you were unable to see this glaring flaw in your own. Could it be that you've still got a bit of that old bloodlust in you after all, matey?

"Th' expense of spirit in a waste of shame
Is lust in action, and till action, lust
Is perjur'd, murd'rous, bloody, full of blame,
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust,
Enjoy'd no sooner but despisèd straight,
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had,
Past reason hated as a swallowed bait
On purpose laid to make the taker mad"

Bradm said...

I'm not really buying your argument here.  Let's say I point to widget A and say "It's designed."   And lets say that there is sufficient positive evidence that reasonable people would agree with me that widget A is designed.   And let's assume that the designer is omnipotent such that everything could potentially be designed even if it isn't recognized as designed.  Given all that, what's the problem?  Who cares whether widget B is recognizable as designed or not?  It might be, it might not be.  I think the only thing you can say in this situation is that some designed things may not be recognizable as designed.  In fact, given the designer is omnipotent, we might expect to find exactly that - that some things look designed and some things don't.  But I don't see how this would be considered vacuous.

In general, I wouldn't say talking about design without talking about the designer necessarily leads to incoherence.  Obviously you can recognize "Welcome to Disneyland" as designed without knowing anything about the designer.  Of course, once recognized as such, you will probably infer that the designer speaks English, has been to California, etc.

SteveMatheson said...

Hi Brad, in my opinion, a design hypothesis is potentially vacuous in the presence of an omnipotent designer. Here's how I see a potentially illuminating conversation.

Jim: "Look at that cluster bomb. It's obviously designed."
Rosy: "Yep."
Jim: "Look at this DNA sequence. It's obviously designed."
Rosy: "Huh?"
Jim: "Well, it shares critical features with the cluster bomb."
Rosy: "I see."
Jim: "Look at these chunks of flesh, containing DNA, splattered on the ground hit by a cluster bomb. This pattern must evince design, but I can't quite see it."
Rosy: "What?!"
Jim: "Well, the world is meticulously overseen by an omnipotent deity, and so every detail about the world is at least potentially designed. (Er, one of my Calvinist buddies says that I don't need to include 'at least potentially'.)"
Rosy: "So. Sometimes this omnipotent designer's actions are obvious to you because they resemble human actions. And the rest of the omnipotent designer's actions are less obvious to you because they don't resemble human actions. But doesn't this mean that everything is potentially designed?"
Jim: [shrug] "Sure. So?"

In my view, Brad, the unfalsifiability of Jim's assertion about the DNA sequence is an interesting and (to me) problematic result of postulating an omnipotent designer. If nothing else, Jim should be cautious when making claims about the actions of this designer, since no action of this designer can be ruled out.

That's my point. YMMV. Thanks for the discussion, and you can have the last word.

SteveMatheson said...

Thanks for the critique. I did think I had made it clear that Casey was only discussing detectability of design. That doesn't make my observation about falsifiability wrong or irrelevant, at least not in my opinion.

Jimpithecus said...

I think that this is kind of like William Dembski's idea that some of creation is designed and some of it isn't.  How would we know which was which?  Maybe the things we think are "designed" intelligently aren't and we just haven't figured out how they work.

bjstroh said...

Hi Steve,

If I understand your argument, the problem isn't the design inference.  The problem is believing that there is an omnipotent designer.  Thus for you, since you believe in an omnipotent designer, your inference for common descent is problematic.  Since there is an omnipotent designer, who is to say that this designer didn't just design things to look as if there was common descent, when in fact there really wasn't.   So for you, there is no point in doing science, since we would never know if we are studying nature or the acts of a designer.

As a solution, I suggest that for those of us who believe in an omnipotent designer, that we start with delineating the characteristics of this designer:  rational, non-capricious, benevolent, non-deceptive.   Thus if it seems that we live in a world that if governed by laws of nature, then we probably do live in such a world.  Therefore, it would make sense to study such a world to determine what those laws are and what they can and cannot accomplish.  When we come across phenomena that natural laws do not seem to be able to accomplish, then we are justified in suspecting that the omnipotent designer may have done some designing over and above those laws. 

SteveMatheson said...

Hey, thanks, yes this is my point exactly. I'm not a big fan of "laws of nature" talk but that's another topic.

I would add that we might have to discuss the extent to which the omnipotent designer (Coco) allows what some call "creaturely freedom" and whether Coco had specific outcomes in mind for her creation. We might stumble on Coco's "benevolence" by looking at how her creation operates. But yes, that's what I'm pointing to. Thanks for the comment.

chunkdz said...

There's plenty of ways to criticize design detection. Putting words in Casey Luskin's mouth is not one of them. Try again.

I can see several ways to counter Luskin's argument. None of them involve the tired old "independent knowledge of the designer" tripe that we've come to expect from folks who are only interested in scoring culture war points.

Instead of arguing against what you think he thinks, why don't you try the time tested technique of actually arguing with what Casey says?

Chris E said...

A non related comment - but have you just switched to only showing a brief snippet of your article on the rss feed? It would be great if it was possible for you to reverse this, and return to allowing the full article to be displayed.

SteveMatheson said...

Yes, I must have changed it when I started using jump breaks. I just set it back to "full" so your feed should show the whole post.

Dave Miller said...

Hi, Steve. You wrote: "If the designer (like the Creator God) is omnipotent, then it is impossible to rule out deliberate design in any place at any time."

Surely we're at the junction of theology, science, and philosophy here...which explains the difficulty in relegating arguments exclusively to one of those three areas.I think, even given your supposition of an omnipotent designer, you are conflating "intended by God" with "designed" here. Take a look at what Behe has to say at and see if that doesn't clarify things. He sees "designed" as a subset of "intended by God," which is empirically detectable.

Dave Miller said...

Hi, Steve. You wrote: "If the designer (like the Creator God) is omnipotent, then it is impossible to rule out deliberate design in any place at any time."

Surely we're at the junction of theology, science, and philosophy here...which explains the difficulty in relegating arguments exclusively to one of those three areas.

I think, even given your supposition of an omnipotent designer, you are conflating "intended by God" with "designed" here. Take a look at what Behe has to say at 
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2009/11/god_design_and_contingency_in028181.html 
and see if that doesn't clarify things. He sees "designed" as a subset of "intended by God," which is empirically detectable.

SteveMatheson said...

Hi Dave, my argument pertains to any omnipotent designer with any set of additional characteristics (including, potentially, mischievousness and malevolence), and my whole point is that "design" is unfalsifiable until the characteristics of the designer are specified. So I'm not conflating intent and design, at least because I'm assuming nothing about the super-being in question in the first place.

No, that piece by Behe really isn't relevant here; he talks of contingent events being potentially "intended" (and I agree with him) but doesn't tell us how/why "contingent" events/processes are not also designed. He cannot, in other words, point to anything that isn't designed, unless and until he tells us exactly which characteristics of the designer led him to that conclusion.

Dave Miller said...

This is weird! My edited comment is gone, your reply to it is gone, Steve, and the original "unedited" version of my comment is all I can see.

This makes my reply to your reply rather cryptic. But I figure everything may reappear again, so here goes:
+++   +++   +++
Holy cow! You replied to my entry before I finished editing it!

I envy your rapid-fire thinking there, Steve. You wrote: “[M]y argument pertains to any omnipotent designer with any set of additional characteristics (including, potentially, mischievousness and malevolence), and my whole point is that ‘design’ is unfalsifiable until the characteristics of the designer are specified.”

I see. But empirically-detectable design is independent of the benevolence or malevolence of the designer. Recall that Behe noted in Edge of Evolution that malaria is designed. (That, in turn, creates a theological or philosophical problem, I suppose.)

And you wrote: “Behe...doesn't tell us how/why ‘contingent’ events/processes are not also designed.”

Doesn’t he? I thought he did a pretty good job of that with that illustration of the wind-blown leaves on his lawn. If they are simply scattered here and there, there are no grounds for a design inference. But if they exhibit complex specification, spelling out “Lay off the beer, buster!” then design can be detected. (But perhaps it’s the product of a malevolent designer, wishing to harm the beer industry.)

Design detection, in other words, doesn’t depend on the prior identification of the characteristics of the designer. Behe’s example seems very similar to the illustration “Luskin” used.

Okay...your turn, Steve.

SteveMatheson said...

Dave, you're right that design detection need not be dependent on knowledge of the designer. I said that in the original post. My point is not about whether design can be detected. See the original post and other comments in this thread.

No, Behe doesn't solve the problem by pointing at leaves on a lawn. He can assert that the configuration doesn't arise from design, and so can you, but absent a specific description of the omnipotent designer, that's nothing but an unjustified assertion. And that's my point.

Martin LaBar said...

Again, thanks for doing this!

Dave Miller said...

Howdy, Steve. You wrote: “No, Behe doesn't solve the problem by pointing at leaves on a lawn. He can assert that the configuration doesn't arise from design, and so can you, but absent a specific description of the omnipotent designer, that's nothing but an unjustified assertion. And that's my point.”



Okay...then I suppose your argument boils down to your defining “design” in the way you wish to define it. Can you say how you wish to define it, please?

Bjstroh said...

So you would agree with the comment: " When we come across phenomena that natural laws [normal operations of creation] do not seem to be able to accomplish, then we are justified in suspecting that the omnipotent designer may have done some designing over and above those laws"?

SteveMatheson said...

No, my definition of 'design' is almost certainly irrelevant. I would use the same definition as Behe or Casey would use, and in neither case would I be able to rule out design of the lovely leaves on the lawn. Coco, after all, was quite the artist, and a designer like her might very well spend nearly all her endless resources sculpting one fantastic scene after another. Behe, IIRC, made a very similar point in DBB, referring to sculpture at Lehigh University.

I'm really glad you are commenting. At this point, though, you are taking us far from the topic of my post. I would like to return to it with a question that you are welcome to ignore. The question: how is design of anything, whether a haphazard flower bed or the shape of a mountain or whatever, ruled out when an omnipotent designer is postulated to exist and work?

Dave Miller said...

Steve, you wrote: "No, my definition of 'design' is almost certainly irrelevant. I would use the same definition as Behe or Casey would use, and in neither case would I be able to rule out design of the lovely leaves on the lawn."

Odd...Behe rules it out.

But it sounds like you're done responding to me. Anybody? Anybody?

SteveMatheson said...

Dave, the rest of my comment included the question of how you (or Behe) accomplished the "ruling out." It's not in the post you linked to. It's not in any of your comments here. I'm done responding to questions about topics I've already covered. But if you want to respond to that question, and explain how Behe knows that God (or Coco) didn't design the leafy pattern on the lawn (or the flower bed of the original post), then we could continue our conversation.

SteveMatheson said...

You're welcome, Martin. Thanks for reading.

Bradm said...

I don't really have much more to say but I am curious if you've ever read Del Ratzsch's Nature, Design, and Science.  It's and excellent book that talks about many of these issues.

Chris E said...

Thanks Steve.

Dave Miller said...

Steve, you wrote: “Dave, the rest of my comment included the question of how you (or Behe) accomplished the ‘ruling out.’”



Okay...I re-read your OP, and now see what Chunkdz means about putting words into Casey Luskin’s mouth, asserting design where ID doesn’t. Sorry to be so late to the party...

Dudley Chapman said...

A number of different issues in this thread, but I would like to address the falsifiability notion first.

It seems to me that most of our well established foundational theories are falsifiable in the strict Popperian sense.   What I mean is that those theories produce a rich set of falsifiable predictions about their subject matter.  Those predictions are either basic assertions that form the theories premises, or predictions that follow by necessity from deductive logic formed on the premises.

For example, Newton's Laws of Motion and Newton's Universal Gravitation are basic assertions.    F = MA makes a precise prediciton about the acceleration of any given mass under any given force.    It is a basic premise of Newtonian theory of motion that is extremely falsifiable.   All of the basic premises of motion can be tested exhaustively in the "short range".    And by short range, I mean through direct experiment and observation.

So we accept the basic premises of Newtonian Physics based on their ability to accumulate a vast documented record of independently tested accurate prediction about mass, force, motion, and gravity.

The theory of evolution can also be characterized by a set of premises that are simple assertions about short range biological phenomenon.    These premises would include simple testable assertions about mutation, inheritance, and selection, all of which are observable in any given generation of an organism.

The problem with evolution is that the claims that some find controversial take place over the "long range" of deep time, where one cannot make direct experiments and observe the accuracy of prediction for ToE.

But I find this to be no different than any other foundational theory in science.    We solved the long range problem hundreds of years ago, and it is this long range extension to falsifiability that gives theories their most important utility.

For example, how does one test F = MA for  the planet Jupiter?   Newton's Laws are universal, yet it would seem that they would be untestable beyond those things we can experiment with directly.   How do we measure the force of gravity between Jupiter and the Sun directly?  How do we apply forces to Jupiter to test F = MA?

The answer is that Newton's Laws of Motion and Gravitation can be combined mathematically and by deductively to create a set of predictions that can be observed over the "long range" of vast distances.    For example, it can be shown easily that Newton's Laws of Motion and Gravity require an orbiting body to follow an elliptical path and forbids all other paths in the process.     This prediction (and hundreds of others) come as an inescapable consequence of deductive logic on the basic short term testable premises.  

One can also combine the basic short term testable premises for evolution and produce long range predictions that come as a logical necessity.    ToE requires that all life on the planet can be organized into a phylogenic tree of nested hierarchies, for example.    And modern analytical techniques show that the basic axioms of evolution form a Markov Process which must yield a distinct Markov signal in the comparison of gene sequences across the spectrum of species.

The Markov signal is a testable logically necessary prediction over the long range of deep time that is analogous to the elliptical orbit signal we get from long range astronomical observations on deep space.

So in regard to the OT, where are the basic premises of ID?   What short range directly observable predictions do they make about biological structures that can be confirmed by anyone?   And what long range predictions over deep time do they produce that requires biology to be just so, and forbids it to be anythinge else?

I maintain that ToE is falsifiable in the same way that Newtonian Physics is falsifiable, or that Maxwell's Equations are falsifiable.   I also maintain that that no claims made by ID fit satisfy the criteria of falsifiability.

Dudley Chapmen said...

ID proponents have offered a version of falsifiability that is really made up of a number of logical fallacies.  For example, the statement that some biological structures will be Irreducibly Complex is not falsifiable unless those biological structures are indentified.The statement that some structured in biology require intelligent agency is in the same category.  Without identifying which structures require ID, those claims are untestable.   They are equivalent to saying that the acceleration of "some" masses can be predicted by F = MA.   Such a claim is unfalsifiable because it contains no specification for indentifying which masses one could use for testing.    Ironically, the risk that F=MA takes on by making its claim universally, also provides the means for falsification.

When ID proponents do indentify a particular structure that is IC, they are unable to provide a justification for why that structure was  chosen.   There are no basic premises that would predict that a particular structure must be IC.    The choice is arbitrary.

Then they insist that the IC claim for a particular structure is falsifiable  since it can be falsified by showing how the structure could come about via an unaided natural process.   For the scientifically unschooled, that sounds like falsifiability, but for any college student who paid attention in his class on logic, it constitutes a classic Appeal To Ignorance.    In other words, the IC claim relies solely on the fact that no one has offered evidence against it.  Or more succintly:

"X is IC, because no one has shown that X is not IC."

And finally, if  someone happens to find a natural pathway for the formation of X, then they just cross X off the list of arbitrarily chosen IC structures and move onto the next one.   Since the claim that X is IC did not come from any basic ID premises, the falsifiation of X as IC does not falsifify any ID premises.

Compare that to how F = MA would be falsified if we found planets following non-elliptical orbits.

Dudley Chapmen said...

One final comment about falsifiability.   The falsifiability of a scientific claim is proportional to what that claim forbids.    In other words, the falsifiability of F = MA comes directly from the notion that F = MA forbids any other outcome than what it predicts for A when an M is subject to an F.     To the extent that one can demonstrate a different A than F =MA predicts, is the extent to which F = MA would be falsified.   And to the extent that one can easily create any number of experiments  with any number of masses and forces it the extent to which F = MA is falsifiable.

As I said before, the very universality of F = MA, as bold as it is, is what makes F = MA emminently falsifiable. 

So when it comes to claims about the requirement for design in nature, one has to ask the question of ID "theory", what does ID theory forbid about structure X, and from what basic testable premise does that forbiddence arise?

So the question is,  what is it about the designer that creates the logical consequence that she would forbid some other outcome in a biological structure than what we observe in that structure?

Or more succtinctly, what does ID theory forbid about biological structures?

Surely the introduction of God really destroys the notion of forbiddence, because the Bible tells us that "With God, all things are possible." - Mt 19:26

But short of a supernatural designer, what do we know about the designer that demonstrates by logical necessity that certain things in her designs would not occur? 

When a claim forbids nothing, it can never be false.   When a claim can never be false, it is unfalsifiable.

Dudley Chapmen said...

I agree with Steve, except that we are equally justified in speculating on any other explanation, such as unicorns or leprechauns as the cause, or any other fanciful explanations we might come up with.

The thing that separates philosophy or theology from science is what happens next.   And what happens next is that one's speculation must be turned into a falsifiable hypothesis.  Otherwise there will be no way of evaluating one fanciful hypothesis and another.

And finally, any hypothesis that relies on the current lack of any other explanation is simply an argument from ignorance.  When science confronts a novel phenomenon, it does not simply go down the list of already known explanations, and finding none, give up.

What it does  is to assume that there are any number of explanations, possibly known or unknown, and then it sets out to find or create one whose falsifiable predictions demonstrate accuracy in relation to the observed phenomena.

As a Christian, I believe that God is the author of all things, including the natural processes in the universe.  But that belief is an article of faith, not a falsifiable hypothesis.     That this leads to a kind of a priori false dichotomy between natural process and design is an artifact of that.  But it in no way lends the dichotomy any other kind of empircal status beyond sentiment.

In other words, I wish we could find explanations for natural processes that demonstrated a requirement for God's intervention (beyond appeals to ignorance, that is).   But that wish comes from an inevitable human weakness of faith, that begs to be corrborated by emprical evidence.

But no one should confuse that with science.

SteveMatheson said...

Yes, I've read it, and it influenced me significantly. Plus Del is a personal friend. It would be fun to discuss sometime.

Dudley Chapmen said...

But even Lakato ultimately requires that theories are evaluated by objective criteria.    How we deal with discrepancies and so forth is the main concern of Kuhn, Popper, and Lakato, but ultimately the notion of "discrepancy" comes back to our ability to make objective measurements about the accuracy of  a theory's predictions.

In science the "truth" of a theory is related almost solely to how accurate it explains or predicts the target phenomenon.    Without falsifiability there is no way to make that discernment.

Popperian falsification, Kuhnian crisis, and Lakato's problemshift all rely on being able to objectivey measure the relative accuracy of competing theories or to at least determine that a given theory has accuracy problems.

But when no falsifiable statements are made at all, and no predictions are made from a theory, neither Kuhn, Popper, nor Lakatos can rescue the hypothesis.

A good test of this with ID is that I can replace the notion of ID with the symbol X without compromising the assertions that are made.For example, "X theory states that there some biological structures could not occur by natural processes without the addition of X."

And I can support my X theory with all the arguments about Irreducible  Complexity.    Since  IC is really not a theory that states something about design, but rather a  theory that states something about evolution.

Therefore the false dichotomy of "Either Design or Evolution", can be replaced with the false dichotomy of "Either X or Evolution"., since all false dichotomies are equivalent.

So in response to your question:

"Assuming your argument is correct - that we can't falsify a theory that postulates an omnipotent designer - then my question for you is ... so what? "

My answer is that therefore any hypothesis about an omnipotent designer can be replaced by any other hypothesis that contains an equally unfalsifiable factor.  If none of those fanciful hypothesis can be falsified, none can be verified.  And of nothing can be verified, then it is indistinquishable from philosophy or theology.

SteveMatheson said...

Dudley, great stuff. Would you like me to help you set up your own blog? :-)

Dudley Chapmen said...

Steve, thanks for the kind words.  As for help in setting up a blog, I can't tell if you are being complimentary, or you are suggesting that I am taking up too much bandwidth in your blog. -)

I have been thinking about blogging on my own, and I actually set one up on Wordpress.  But I find that the give and take of forums and comment sections inspire me to write more than the idea of writing for an unknown readership.So depending on the reason for your comment, I will either contribute more here, or go and find my own soapbox and see what I can accomplish.  

 Regardless, I am a big fan of your blog.  It is on my top 10 blogs that I read most every day. 

Jonathan Bartlett said...

Steve -

I agree that the question, *as you posed it*, is unfalsifiable.  However, I think that this is not the way in which the question should be posed.  In fact, Dembski deals with this at length in, I think it was "The Design Revolution".

In any case, the question that you posed was "was X designed?"  However, I think the question as it needs to be posed is "did X require design?"  I think that is a much more answerable question, and doesn't require different answers if God is omnipotent or not.  

The computer I'm typing on required design.  A splatter of paint on a canvas might have been designed for a modern abstract art piece, or it might be the result of my children knocking over a can of paint.  The question is not "was X designed?"  but "does X require design?"  The latter question is much more answerable than the former.